g in
the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the
migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
Congress prior to the year 1808," said, "This is an exception from the
power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is to continue only
till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent
future importations."

Were I, however, to admit that the right "to regulate commerce," does
not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce, it nevertheless
would not follow, that Congress might not prohibit or destroy certain
branches of commerce. It might need to do so, in order to preserve our
general commerce with a state or nation. So large a proportion of the
cloths of Turkey might be fraught with the contagion of the plague, as
to make it necessary for our Government to forbid the importation of all
cloths from that country, and thus totally destroy one branch of our
commerce with it, to the end that the other branches might be preserved.
No inconsiderable evidence that Congress has the right to prohibit or
destroy a branch of commerce, is to be found in the fact, that it has
done so. From March, 1794, to May, 1820, it enacted several laws, which
went to prohibit or destroy, and, in the end, did prohibit or destroy
the trade of this country with Africa in human beings. And, if Congress
has the power to pass embargo laws, has it not the power to prohibit or
destroy commerce altogether?

It is, however, wholly immaterial, whether Congress could prohibit our
participation in the "African slave trade," in virtue of the clause
which empowers it "to regulate commerce." That the Constitution does, in
some one or more of its passages, convey the power, is manifest from the
testimony of the Constitution itself. The first clause of the ninth
section says: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of
the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to they year 1808." Now the implication
in this clause of the existence of the power in question, is as
conclusive, as would be the express and positive grant of it. You will
observe, too, that the power of Congress over "migration or
importation," which this clause implies, is a power not merely to
"regulate," as you define the word, but to "prohibit."

It is clear, then, that Congress had the po