anged between the Governments of the Transvaal and Great Britain but
which it was alleged had not been published in the Blue Books. This
assertion of sinister motives on the part of Great Britain exerted
little influence upon foreign governments in Europe. The delegation
realized the impossibility of securing the interference of a concert of
Powers or of any one State against the wishes of England. The mission of
the Boers had been doomed to failure from the beginning.
The action of the Queen of Holland in receiving the delegation was
generally understood as not of an unneutral character but as inspired by
sympathy for a kindred people and a willingness to mediate though not to
intervene. It was recognized that no nation whose interests were not
directly concerned could afford to persist in offers of mediation in
view of the fact that Great Britain had already intimated to the United
States that such an offer could not be accepted. Although Holland
refused to intervene, the attitude assumed by the Dutch Government in
other respects caused severe criticism in England. The chief
circumstance which confirmed the opinion that Holland as a neutral State
had not displayed a proper attitude at Lorenzo Marques was the fact that
after the visit of the envoys of the Transvaal the Hague Government had
sent a man-of-war to the island of St. Helena, which was being used as a
prison for the Boers who were transported from South Africa. This
proceeding was viewed by England as officious from the fact that foreign
men-of-war were not usually received at that port. Popular feeling saw
in the despatch of the man-of-war an unfriendly act which might easily
have led to difficulty. But the incident, aside from the benevolent
character which Holland had given to the enforcement of her neutrality
laws throughout the war, had no significance in international law. It
was generally considered, however, that the feeling which England
manifested with regard to the visit of the cruiser gave some ground for
the suspicion that the British Government might have had something to
conceal at St. Helena.
The general attitude of Germany, France and Russia toward the Boer
mission was guided by a policy of strict adherence to the neutral
obligations assumed at the beginning of the war. These Powers in their
official statements all followed such a course, realizing that it was
demanded by a sound foreign policy. They considered the idea of
intervention out
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