ntradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth
century, it is now generally recognized that a violation of the duty of
impartiality is involved when a neutral allows a belligerent the passage
of troops or the transport of war material over his territory. And it
matters not whether a neutral give such permission to one of the
belligerents only, or to both alike."[14] And Lawrence points out that
"It is now acknowledged almost universally that a neutral state which
permits the passage of any part of a belligerent army through its
territory is acting in such a partial manner as to draw down upon itself
just reprobation." The permission given of necessity "to further a
warlike end" is "therefore inconsistent with the fundamental principle
of state neutrality." "These considerations," he says, "have influenced
practice during the present century, and the weight of modern precedent
is against the grant of passage in any case."[15]
[Footnote 14: International Law (1906), Vol. II, p. 345]
[Footnote 15: Principles of International Law, p. 526. The older writers
differed from this view. Grotius maintained the right of passage, even
by force; Vattel practically agreed with Grotius that it might be taken
by force, but contended that it should be asked and force used only
under extreme necessity, or when the refusal was unjust; Wheaton denied
that the right of passage was a "perfect right" and consequently could
not be enforced against the will of the neutral; Hall, International Law
(1880), Sec.219, points out that more recent writers take an opposite view,
namely, that a grant of passage is incapable of impartial distribution.
See also Wheaton, International Law, Sec.427; Vattel, Droit des gens, III,
Sec.110; Calvo, Droit international, 3d Ed., III, Sec.Sec.2344-2347.]
Mr. Baty, who has made a careful study of the precedents upon the
subject, states that while "writers vary in their treatment of the
question" of the passage of troops over neutral territory, "the modern
authorities are all one way."[16] He points out that the jurists of the
first half of the nineteenth century, with the possible exception of
Klueber, were "unanimous in following" Grotius and Vattel, and allowing
neutrals to permit belligerents passage as long as they did it
impartially. But since the middle of the century a total and violent
change in the opinion of authors has operated. Every modern author holds
that passage is now a benefit which must be r
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