navy and issue letters of marque and reprisal; it could
support an army and provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions.
But in relation to this question of the army and the militia there was
some characteristic discussion. It was at first proposed that Congress
should have the power "to subdue a rebellion in any state on the
application of its legislature." The Shays rebellion was then fresh in
the memory of all the delegates, and their arguments simply reflected
the impression which that unpleasant affair had left upon them. Charles
Pinckney, Gouverneur Morris, and John Langdon wished to have the power
given to Congress unconditionally, without waiting for an application
from the legislature. But Gerry, who had been on the ground, spoke
sturdily against such a needless infraction of state rights. He was
utterly opposed, he said, to "letting loose the myrmidons of the United
States on a state without its own consent. The states will be the best
judges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massachusetts
in the late insurrection if the general authority had intermeddled."
Ellsworth suggested that Congress should use its discretion only in
cases where the legislature of the state could not meet; but Randolph
forcibly replied that if Congress is to judge whether a state
legislature can or cannot meet, the difficulty is in no wise surmounted.
Gerry's view at last prevailed, and in accordance therewith it was
decided that the federal power should guarantee to every state a
republican form of government, and should protect each of them against
invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (if
the legislature could not be convened), it should protect them against
domestic violence. This arrangement did not fully provide against such
an emergency as that of rival and hostile executives in the same state,
as under the so-called "carpet-bag" governments which followed after the
War of Secession, but it was doubtless as sound a provision as any
general constitution could make.

The federal government was further empowered to borrow money on the
credit of the United States; and it was declared that all debts
contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this
constitution should be as valid against the United States under this
constitution as under the confederation. There was to be no repudiation
or re