able to be made
the engine of imposition and fraud, holding out temptations equally
pernicious to the integrity of government and to the morals of the
people." Paterson called it "sanctifying iniquity by law." The same
views were entertained by Washington and Madison. There were a few
delegates, however, who thought it unsafe to fetter Congress absolutely.
To use Luther Martin's expression, they did not set themselves up to be
"wise beyond every event." George Mason said he "had a mortal hatred to
paper money, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was
unwilling to tie the hands of the legislature. The late war," he
thought, "could not have been carried on had such a prohibition
existed." Randolph spoke to the same effect. It was finally decided, by
the vote of nine states against New Jersey and Maryland, that the power
to issue inconvertible paper should not be granted to the federal
government. An express prohibition, such as had been adopted for the
separate states, was thought unnecessary. It was supposed that it was
enough to withhold the power, since the federal government would not
venture to exercise it unless expressly permitted in the Constitution.
"Thus," says Madison, in his narrative of the proceedings, "the pretext
for a paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender,
either for public or private debts, was cut off." Nothing could be more
clearly expressed than this. As Mr. Justice Field observes, in his able
dissenting opinion in the recent case of Juilliard _vs._ Greenman, "if
there be anything in the history of the Constitution which can be
established with moral certainty, it is that the framers of that
instrument intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes both by
the general government and by the states, and thus prevent interference
with the contracts of private parties." Such has been the opinion of our
ablest constitutional jurists, Marshall, Webster, Story, Curtis, and
Nelson. There can be little doubt that, according to all sound
principles of interpretation, the Legal Tender Act of 1862 was passed in
flagrant violation of the Constitution. Could Ellsworth and Morris,
Langdon and Madison, have foreseen the possibility of such extraordinary
judgments as have lately emanated from the Supreme Court of the United
States, they would doubtless have insisted upon the express prohibition,
instead of leaving it to posterity to root out the plague, as it will
apparently s