elected, it chooses this prime minister, and he appoints the other
chairmen who are to make up his cabinet. Suppose, too, that he initiates
all legislation, and executes all laws, and stays in office three weeks
or thirty years, or as long as he can get a majority of the house to
vote for his measures. If he loses his majority, he can either resign or
dissolve the house, and order a new election, thus appealing directly to
the people. If the new house gives him a majority, he stays in office;
if it shows a majority against him, he steps down into the house, and
becomes, perhaps, the leader of the opposition.

Now if this were the form of our government, it would correspond in all
essential features to that of England. The likeness is liable to be
obscured by the fact that in England it is the queen who is supposed to
appoint the prime minister; but that is simply a part of the antiquated
"literary theory" of the English Constitution. In reality the queen only
acts as mistress of the ceremonies. Whatever she may wish, the prime
minister must be the man who can command the best working majority in
the house. This is not only tested by the first vote that is taken, but
it is almost invariably known beforehand so well that if the queen
offers the place to the wrong man he refuses to take it. Should he be so
foolish as to take it, he is sure to be overthrown at the first test
vote, and then the right man comes in. Thus in 1880 the queen's manifest
preference for Lord Granville or Lord Hartington made no sort of
difference. Mr. Gladstone was as much chosen by the House of Commons as
if the members had sat in their seats and balloted for him. If the crown
were to be abolished to-morrow, and the house were henceforth, on the
resignation of a prime minister, to elect a new one to serve as long as
he could command a majority, it would not be doing essentially otherwise
than it does now. The house then dismisses its minister when it rejects
one of his important measures. But while thus appointed and dismissed by
the house, he is in no wise its slave; for by the power of dissolution
he has the right to appeal to the country, and let the general election
decide the issue. The obvious advantages of this system are that it
makes anything like a deadlock between the legislature and the executive
impossible; and it insures a concentration of responsibility. The prime
minister's bills cannot be disregarded, like the president's messages;