and thus, too, the house is kept in hand, and cannot degenerate into a
debating club.[9]
[Sidenote: In the British government, the executive department is not
separated from the legislative.]
A system so delicate and subtle, yet so strong and efficient, as this
could no more have been invented by the wisest of statesmen than a
chemist could make albumen by taking its elements and mixing them
together. In its practical working it is a much simpler system than
ours, and still its principal features are not such as would be likely
to occur to men who had not had some actual experience of them. It is
the peculiar outgrowth of English history. As we can now see, its chief
characteristic is its not separating the executive power from the
legislative. As a member of Parliament, the prime minister introduces
the legislation which he is himself expected to carry into effect. Nor
does the English system even keep the judiciary entirely separate, for
the lord chancellor not only presides over the House of Lords, but sits
in the cabinet as the prime minister's legal adviser. It is somewhat as
if the chief justice of the United States were _ex officio_ president of
the Senate and attorney-general; though here the resemblance is somewhat
superficial. Our Senate, although it does not represent landed
aristocracy or the church, but the federal character of our government,
has still a superficial resemblance to the House of Lords. It passes on
all bills that come up from the lower house, and can originate bills on
most matters, but not for raising revenue. Its function as a high court
of impeachment, with the chief justice for its presiding officer, was
directly copied from the House of Lords. But here the resemblance ends.
The House of Lords has no such veto upon the House of Commons as our
Senate has upon the House of Representatives. Between our upper and
lower houses a serious deadlock is possible; but the House of Lords can
only reject a bill until it sees that the House of Commons is determined
to have it carried. It can only enter a protest. If it is obstinate and
tries to do more, the House of Commons, through its prime minister, can
create enough new peers to change the vote,--a power so formidable in
its effects upon the social position of the peerage that it does not
need to be used. The knowledge that it exists is enough to bring the
House of Lords to terms.
[Sidenote: Circumstances which obscured the true aspect of th
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