looking
for that guidance: or if, believing that Zeus cares about his
conquering his passions less than he really does, he should become
careless and despairing in the struggle: or if, believing that Zeus
is less interested in the welfare of mankind than he really is, he
should himself neglect to assist them, and so lose the glory of
being called a benefactor of his country: would not all these
mistakes be hurtful ones?"
"Certainly," said I: but Alcibiades was silent.
S. "And would not these mistakes, by the hypothesis, themselves
punish him who made them, without any resentment whatsoever, or
Nemesis of the Gods being required for his chastisement?"
"It seems so," said I.
S. "But can we say of such mistakes, and of the harm which may
accrue from them, anything but that they must both be infinite;
seeing that they are mistakes concerning an infinite Being, and his
infinite properties, on every one of which, and on all together, our
daily existence depends?"
P. "It seems so."
S. "So that, until such a man's error concerning Zeus, the source
of all things, is cleared up, either in this life or in some future
one, we cannot but fear for him infinite confusion, misery, and
harm, in all matters which he may take in hand?"
Then Alcibiades, angrily: "What ugly mask is this you have put on,
Socrates? You speak rather like a priest trying to frighten rustics
into paying their first-fruits, than a philosopher inquiring after
that which is beautiful. But you shall never terrify me into
believing that it is not a noble thing to speak out whatsoever a man
believes, and to go forward boldly in the spirit of truth."
S. "Feeling first, I hope, with your staff, as would be but
reasonable in the case of the bridge, whether your belief was
objectively or only subjectively true, lest you should fall through
your subjective bridge into objective water. Nevertheless, leaving
the bridge and the water, let us examine a little what this said
spirit of truth may be. How do you define it?"
A. "I assert that whosoever says honestly what he believes, does so
by the spirit of truth."
S. "Then if Lyce, patting those soft cheeks of yours, were to say:
'Alcibiades, thou art the fairest youth in Athens,' she would speak
by the spirit of truth?"
A. "They say so."
S. "And they say rightly. But if Lyce, as is her custom, wished,
by so saying, to cheat you into believing that she loved you, and
thereby to whe
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