ced the question boldly?"

A. "I cannot tell."

S. "Nor I either. Yet one thing more it may be worth our while to
examine. If one should mistake concerning God, will his error be
one of excess, or defect?"

A. "How can I tell?"

S. "Let us see. Is not Zeus more perfect than all other beings?"

A. "Certainly, if it be true that, as they say, the perfection of
each kind of being is derived from him; he must therefore be himself
more perfect than any one of those perfections."

S. "Well argued. Therefore, if he conceived of himself, his
conception of himself would be more perfect than that of any man
concerning him?"

A. "Assuredly; if he have that faculty, he must needs have it in
perfection."

S. "Suppose, then, that he conceived of one of his own properties,
such as his justice; how large would that perfect conception of his
be?"

A. "But how can I tell, Socrates?"

S. "My good friend, would it not be exactly commensurate with that
justice of his?"

A. "How then?"

S. "Wherein consists the perfection of any conception, save in
this, that it be the exact copy of that whereof it is conceived, and
neither greater nor less?"

A. "I see now."

S. "Without the Pythia's help, I should say. But, tell me-We agree
that Zeus's conception of his own justice will be exactly
commensurate with his justice?"

A. "We do."

S. "But man's conception thereof, it has been agreed, would be
certainly less perfect than Zeus's?"

A. "It would."

S. "Man, then, it seems, would always conceive God to be less just
than God conceives himself to be?"

A. "He would."

S. "And therefore to be less just, according to the argument, than
he really is?"

A. "True."

S. "And therefore his error concerning Zeus, would be in this case
an error of defect?"

A. "It would."

S. "And so on of each of his other properties?"

A. "The same argument would likewise, as far as I can see, apply to
them."

S. "So that, on the whole, man, by the unassisted power of his own
faculty, will always conceive Zeus to be less just, wise, good, and
beautiful than he is?"

A. "It seems probable."

S. "But does not that seem to you hurtful?"

A. "Why so?"

S. "As if, for instance, a man believing that Zeus loves him less
than he really does, should become superstitious and self-
tormenting. Or, believing that Zeus will guide him less than he
really will, he should go his own way through life without