y who possessed the
spirit of truth saw facts as they are; for that was involved in our
definition of the spirit of truth."
P. "But, Socrates, I knew, at least, that one and one made two, and
that a horse had four legs. I must then have seen some facts as
they are."
S. "Doubtless, fair boy; but not all."
P. "I do not pretend to that."
S. "But if you had possessed the spirit of truth, you would have
seen all facts whatsoever as they are. For he who possesses a thing
can surely employ it freely for all purposes which are not contrary
to the nature of that thing; can he not?"
P. "Of course he can. But if I did not possess the spirit of
truth, how could I see any truth whatsoever?"
S. "Suppose, dear boy, that instead of your possessing it, it were
possible for it to possess you; and possessing you, to show you as
much of itself, or as little, as it might choose, and concerning
such things only as it might choose: would not that explain the
dilemma?"
P. "It would assuredly."
S. "Let us see, then, whether this spirit of truth may not be
something which is capable of possessing you, and employing you,
rather than of being possessed and employed by you. To me, indeed,
this spirit seems likely to be some demon or deity, and that one of
the greatest."
P. "Why then?"
S. "Can lifeless and material things see?"
P. "Certainly not; only live ones."
S. "This spirit, then, seems to be living; for it sees things as
they are."
P. "Yes."
S. "And it is also intellectual; for intellectual facts can be only
seen by an intellectual being."
P. "True."
S. "And also moral; for moral facts can only be seen by a moral
being."
P. "True also."
S. "But this spirit is evidently not a man; it remains therefore,
that it must be some demon."
P. "But why one of the greatest?"
S. "Tell me, Phaethon, is not God to be numbered among facts as
they are?"
P. "Assuredly; for he is before all others and more eternal and
absolute than all."
S. "Then this spirit of truth must also be able to see God as he
is."
P. "It is probable."
S. "And certain, if, as we agreed, it be the very spirit which sees
all facts whatsoever as they are. Now tell me, can the less see the
greater as it is?"
P. "I think not; for an animal cannot see a man as he is, but only
that part of him in which he is like an animal, namely, his outward
figure and his animal passions; but not his moral sense o
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