therefore not a moral faculty, this spirit of truth. Let
us see now whether it be an intellectual one. How are intellectual
things defined, Phaethon? Tell me, for you are cunning in such
matters."

P. "Those things which have to do with processes of the mind."

S. "With right processes, or with wrong?"

P. "With right, of course."

S. "And processes for what purpose?"

P. "For the discovery of facts."

S. "Of facts as they are, or as they are not?"

P. "As they are."

S. "And he who discovers facts as they are, discovers truth; while
he who discovers facts as they are not, discovers falsehood?"

P. "He discovers nothing, Socrates."

S. "True; but it has been agreed already that the spirit of truth
is indifferent to the question whether facts be true or false, but
only concerns itself with the sincere affirmation of them,
whatsoever they may be. Much more then must it be indifferent to
those processes by which they are discovered."

P. "How so?"

S. "Because it only concerns itself with affirmation concerning
facts; but these processes are anterior to that affirmation."

P. "I comprehend."

S. "And much more is it indifferent to whether those are right
processes or not."

P. "Much more so."

S. "It is therefore not intellectual. It remains, therefore, that
it must be some merely physical faculty, like that of fearing,
hungering, or enjoying the sexual appetite."

A. "Absurd, Socrates!"

S. "That is the argument's concern, not ours: let us follow
manfully whithersoever it may lead us."

A. "Lead on, thou sophist!"

S. "It was agreed, then, that he who does what he thinks right,
does so by the spirit of truth-was it not?"

A. "It was."

S. "Then he who eats when he thinks that he ought to eat, does so
by the spirit of truth?"

A. "What next?"

S. "This next, that he who blows his nose when he thinks that it
wants blowing, blows his nose by the spirit of truth."

A. "What next?"

S. "Do not frown, friend. Believe me, in such days as these, I
honour even the man who is honest enough to blow his nose because he
finds that he ought to do so. But tell me-a horse, when he shies at
a beggar, does not he also do so by the spirit of truth? For he
believes sincerely the beggar to be something formidable, and
honestly acts upon his conviction."

"Not a doubt of it," said I, laughing, in spite of myself, at
Alcibiades's countenance.

S. "It is in danger, the