edle you out of a new shawl, she would still speak by
the spirit of truth?"

A. "I suppose so."

S. "But if, again, she said the same thing to Phaethon, she would
still speak by the spirit of truth?"

"By no means, Socrates," said I, laughing.

S. "Be silent, fair boy; you are out of court as an interested
party. Alcibiades shall answer. If Lyce, being really mad with
love, like Sappho, were to believe Phaethon to be fairer than you,
and say so, she would still speak by the spirit of truth?"

A. "I suppose so."

S. "Do not frown; your beauty is in no question. Only she would
then be saying what is not true?"

"I must answer for him after all," said I.

S. "Then it seems, from what has been agreed, that it is
indifferent to the spirit of truth, whether it speak truth or not.
The spirit seems to be of an enviable serenity. But suppose again,
that I believed that Alcibiades had an ulcer on his leg, and were to
proclaim the same now to the people, when they come into the Pnyx,
should I not be speaking by the spirit of truth?"

A. "But that would be a shameful and blackguardly action."

S. "Be it so. It seems, therefore, that it is indifferent to the
spirit of truth whether that which it affirms be honourable or
blackguardly. Is it not so?"

A. "It seems so, most certainly, in that case at least."

S. "And in others, as I think. But tell me-Is not the man who does
what he believes, as much moved by this your spirit of truth as he
who says what he believes?"

A. "Certainly he is."

S. "Then if I believed it right to lie or steal, I, in lying or
stealing, should lie or steal by the spirit of truth?"

A. "Certainly: but that is impossible."

S. "My fine fellow, and wherefore? I have heard of a nation among
the Indians who hold it a sacred duty to murder every one not of
their own tribe, whom they can waylay: and when they are taken and
punished by the rulers of that country, die joyfully under the
greatest torments, believing themselves certain of an entrance into
the Elysian fields, in proportion to the number of murders which
they have committed."

A. "They must be impious wretches."

S. "Be it so. But believing themselves to be right, they commit
murder by the spirit of truth."

A. "It seems to follow from the argument."

S. "Then it is indifferent to the spirit of truth whether the
action which it prompts be right or wrong?"

A. "It must be confessed."

S. "It is