1882); Orlich, _Gesch. der schlesischen Kriege_; Deroy,
_Beitraege zur Gesch. des oesterr. Erbfolgekrieges_ (Munich, 1883);
Crousse, _La Guerre de la succession dans les provinces belgiques_ (Paris,
1885); Duncker, _Militaerische, &c., Aktenstuecke zur Gesch. des I. schles.
Krieges_; _Militaer-Wochenblatt_ supplements 1875, 1877, 1878, 1883, 1891,
1901, &c. (Berlin); _Mitteilungen des k.k. Kriegsarchivs_, from 1887
(Vienna); Baumgart, _Die Litteratur, &c., ueber Friedrich d. Gr_. (Berlin,
1886); Fortescue, _History of the British Army_, vol. ii.; F. H. Skrine,
_Fontenoy and the War of the Austrian Succession_ (London, 1906); Francis
Parkman, _A Half-Century of Conflict_ (1892).

(C. F. A.)

_Naval Operations._

The naval operations of this war were languid and confused. They are
complicated by the fact that they were entangled with the Spanish war,
which broke out in 1739 in consequence of the long disputes between England
and Spain over their conflicting claims in America. Until the closing years
they were conducted with small intelligence or spirit. The Spanish
government was nerveless, and sacrificed its true interest to the family
ambition of the king Philip V., who wished to establish his younger sons as
ruling princes in Italy. French administration was corrupt, and the
government was chiefly concerned in its political interests in Germany. The
British navy was at its lowest point of energy [v.03 p.0044] and efficiency
after the long administration of Sir Robert Walpole. Therefore, although
the war contained passages of vigour, it was neither interesting nor
decisive on the sea.

War on Spain was declared by Great Britain on the 23rd of October 1739. It
was universally believed that the Spanish colonies would fall at once
before attack. A plan was laid for combined operations against them from
east and west. One force, military and naval, was to assault them from the
West Indies under Admiral Edward Vernon. Another, to be commanded by
Commodore George Anson, afterwards Lord Anson, was to round Cape Horn and
to fall upon the Pacific coast. Delays, bad preparations, dockyard
corruption, and the unpatriotic squabbles of the naval and military
officers concerned caused the failure of a hopeful scheme. On the 21st of
November 1739 Admiral Vernon did indeed succeed in capturing the
ill-defended Spanish harbour of Porto Bello (in the present republic of
Panama)--a trifling success to boast of. But he did nothing to pr