y a bribe; and so far as any of these cases can be traced,
his decisions, often given in conjunction with some other official, are to
all appearance thoroughly just. In several cases his judgment appears to
have been given against the party bestowing the bribe, and in at least one
instance, that of Lady Wharton, it seems impossible to doubt that he must
have known when accepting the present that his opinion would be adverse to
her cause. Although, then, he felt that these practices were really
corrupt, and even rejoiced that his own fall would tend to purify the
courts from them,[40] he did not feel that he was guilty of perverting
justice for the sake of reward. How far, then, is such defence or
explanation admissible and satisfactory? It is clear that two things are to
be considered: the one the guilt of taking bribes or presents on any
consideration, the other the moral guilt depending upon the wilful
perversion of justice. The attempt has sometimes been made to defend the
whole of Bacon's conduct on the ground that he did nothing that was not
done by many of his contemporaries. Bacon himself disclaims a defence of
this nature, and we really have no direct evidence which shows to what
extent the offering and receiving of such bribes then prevailed. That the
practice was common is indeed implied by the terms in which Bacon speaks of
it, and it is not improbable that the fact of these gifts being taken by
officials was a thing fairly well known, although all were aware of their
illegal character, and it was plain that any public exposure of such
dealings would be fatal to the individual against whom the charge was made
out.[41] Bacon knew all this; he was well aware that the practice was in
itself indefensible,[42] and that his conduct was therefore corrupt and
deserving of censure. So far, then, as the mere taking of bribes is
concerned, he would permit no defence, and his own confession and judgment
on his action contain as severe a condemnation as has ever been passed upon
him. Yet in the face of this he does not hesitate to call himself "the
justest chancellor that hath been in the five changes since Sir Nicholas
Bacon's time";[43] and this on the plea that his intentions had always been
pure, and had never been affected by the presents he received. His
justification has been set aside by modern critics, not on the ground that
the evidence demonstrates its falsity,[44] but because it is inconceivable
or unnatural that