the measure of the
universe," whereas, in truth, the world is received by us in a distorted
and erroneous manner. The second kind are the _Idola Specus_, idols of the
cave, or errors incident to the peculiar mental or bodily constitution of
each individual, for according to the state of the individual's mind is his
view of things. Errors of this class are innumerable, because there are
numberless varieties of disposition; but some very prominent specimens can
be indicated. Such are the tendency to make all things subservient to, or
take the colour of some favourite subject, the extreme fondness and
reverence either for what is ancient or for what is modern, and excess in
noting either differences or resemblances amongst things. A practical rule
for avoiding these is also given: "In general let every student of nature
take this as a rule, that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with
particular satisfaction is to be held in suspicion."[59] The third class
are the _Idola Fori_, idols of the market-place, errors arising from the
influence exercised over the mind by mere words. This, according to Bacon,
is the most troublesome kind of error, and has been especially fatal in
philosophy. For words introduce a fallacious mode of looking at things in
two ways: first, there are some words that are really merely names for
non-existent things, which are yet supposed to exist simply because they
have received a name; secondly, there are names hastily and unskilfully
abstracted from a few objects and applied recklessly to all that has the
faintest analogy with these objects, thus causing the grossest confusion.
The fourth and last class are the _Idola Theatri_, idols of the theatre,
_i.e._ fallacious modes of thinking resulting from received systems of
philosophy and from erroneous methods of demonstration. The criticism of
the demonstrations is introduced later in close connexion with Bacon's new
method; they are the rival modes of procedure, to which his own is
definitely opposed. The philosophies which are "redargued" are divided into
three classes, the sophistical, of which the best example is Aristotle,
who, according to Bacon, forces nature into his abstract schemata and
thinks to explain by definitions; the empirical, which from few and limited
experiments leaps at once to general conclusions; and the superstitious,
which corrupts philosophy by the introduction of poetical and theological
notions.

Such are the general ca