ny volumes as Pliny's _History_? ... For the true
natural history is to take nothing except instances, connections,
observations and canons."[88] The _Organum_ and the _History_ are thus
correlative, and form the two equally necessary sides of a true philosophy;
by their union the new philosophy is produced.

_Summary._--Two questions may be put to any doctrine which professes to
effect a radical change in philosophy or science. Is it original? Is it
valuable? With regard to the first, it has been already pointed out that
Bacon's induction or inductive method is distinctly his own, though it
cannot and need not be maintained that the general spirit of his philosophy
was entirely new.[89]

The value of the method is the separate and more difficult question. It has
been assailed on the most opposite grounds. Macaulay, while admitting the
accuracy of the process, denied its efficiency, on the ground that an
operation performed naturally was not rendered more easy or efficacious by
being subjected to analysis.[90] This objection is curious when confronted
with Bacon's reiterated assertion that the _natural_ method pursued by the
unassisted human reason is distinctly opposed to his; and it is besides an
argument that tells so strongly against many sciences, as to be
comparatively worthless when applied to any one. There are, however, more
formidable objections against the method. It has been pointed out,[91] and
with perfect justice, [v.03 p.0150] that science in its progress has not
followed the Baconian method, that no one discovery can be pointed to which
can be definitely ascribed to the use of his rules, and that men the most
celebrated for their scientific acquirements, while paying homage to the
name of Bacon, practically set at naught his most cherished precepts. The
reason of this is not far to seek, and has been pointed out by logicians of
the most diametrically opposed schools. The mechanical character both of
the natural history and of the logical method applied to it resulted
necessarily from Bacon's radically false conception of the nature of cause
and of the causal relation. The whole logical or scientific problem is
treated as if it were one of co-existence, to which in truth the method of
exclusion is scarcely applicable, and the assumption is constantly made
that each phenomenon has one and only one cause.[92] The inductive
formation of axioms by a gradually ascending scale is a route which no
science has e