e as necessary elements in the
inductive process. But he was certainly not ignorant of what may be called
a deductive method, and of a kind of hypothesis. This is clear from the use
he makes of the _Vindemiatio_, from certain hints as to the testing of
axioms, from his admission of the syllogism into physical reasoning, and
from what he calls _Experientia Literata_. The function of the
_Vindemiatio_ has been already pointed out; with regard to axioms, he says
(_N. O._ i. 106), "In establishing axioms by this kind of induction, we
must also examine and try whether the axiom so established be framed to the
measure of these particulars, from which it is derived, or whether it be
larger or wider. And if it be larger and wider, we must observe whether, by
indicating to us new particulars, it confirm that wideness and largeness as
by a collateral security, that we may not either stick fast in things
already known, or loosely grasp at shadows and abstract forms, not at
things solid and realized in matter." (Cf. also the passage from _Valerius
Terminus_, quoted in Ellis's note on the above aphorism.) Of the syllogism
he says, "I do not propose to give up the syllogism altogether. S. is
incompetent for the principal things rather than useless for the
generality. In the mathematics there is no reason why it should not be
employed. It is the flux of matter and the inconstancy of the physical body
which requires induction, that thereby it may be fixed as it were, and
allow the formation of notions well defined. In physics you wisely note,
and therein I agree with you, that after the notions of the first class and
the axioms concerning them have been by induction well made out and
defined, syllogism may be applied safely; only it must be restrained from
leaping at once to the most general notions, and progress must be made
through a fit succession of steps."--("Letter to Baranzano," _Letters and
Life_, vii. 377). And with this may be compared what he says of mathematics
(_Nov. Org._ ii. 8; _Parasceve_, vii.). In his account of _Experientia
Literata_ (_De Aug._ v. 2) he comes very near to the modern mode of
experimental research. It is, he says, the procedure from one experiment to
another, and it is not a science but an art or learned sagacity (resembling
in this Aristotle's [Greek: anchinoia]), which may, however, be enlightened
by the precepts of the _Interpretatio_. Eight varieties of such experiments
are enumerated, and a compariso