ers were not long in following their example.

It was now Holland's turn to feel aggrieved. She refused to recognise
the changes proposed by the powers in the terms which she had already
accepted. On May 21 she had declared that if the protocol of January 20
were not accepted by June 1 she would consider herself free to act on
her own account, and on July 12 that the acceptance in Belgium of a king
who had not agreed to that protocol would be an act of hostility.
Feeling herself betrayed by the conference she gave notice on August 1
that the armistice which had existed since the previous November would
terminate on the 4th. It was soon seen how much Holland had lost in the
preceding year by being found in a state of military unpreparedness.
When hostilities began the Dutch carried everything before them. On the
8th the Belgians were routed at Hasselt, and on the 13th Leopold in
person was compelled to surrender Louvain. But Holland was now arrested
in the full tide of her success. The opportunity that French patriots
had long desired had presented itself, and Louis Philippe would only
have endangered his own throne if he had failed to come to the
assistance of Belgium against Holland. On the 4th he received Leopold's
appeal for assistance; on the 12th the first French division reached
Brussels, and on the following day the Prince of Orange, who led the
main Dutch army, received orders from the Hague to retire within the
Dutch frontier.

[Pageheading: _COERCION OF HOLLAND._]

The conference had in fact found it necessary to join in measures of
coercion. On the first news of the outbreak of hostilities it severely
reproached Holland for the breach of the armistice, and ordered the
Dutch forces to retire. By a protocol of the 6th it accepted and
justified the French expedition, which, it knew, could not safely be
recalled, and tried to minimise the danger by forbidding the French to
cross the Dutch frontier and requiring them to return to France as soon
as the Dutch should return to Holland. At the same time a semblance of
joint action was created by the despatch of a British fleet to the
Downs. If the Dutch invasion of Belgium created excitement in France,
the French expedition had a similar effect in England, and Palmerston
found it necessary to insist sternly on the immediate evacuation of
Belgium upon the withdrawal of the Dutch troops. The French government
naturally desired to point to some tangible triumph of Fren