thority {381} of a moral law; for there is
neither freedom nor an objective moral authority. The single man is but the
product of a certain sum and mixture of powers of nature, acting of
necessity, which may with him turn out fortunately or unfortunately. If, on
the other hand, man is morally perverted, society may defend itself against
his perversity; wisdom may try to convince him of the bad consequences of
his perversity for himself and society; the effect of his perversity may
make him sensible of the bad consequences of his actions: but there is no
other objectively valid corrective of his perversity. If he is successful
in his immoral action, and if he silences his conscience, this voice of the
unobserved higher instinct in favor of the preferred lower--which
unfortunately, as is well known, succeeds oftenest and most easily in the
case of those whose perversity has become the most habitual, and in whom
another grouping of instincts would be most desirable--then the whole
affair is settled, and he is absolved. Let us be understood correctly. We
do not say that all advocates of mechanical or monistic ethics draw these
conclusions in reality; we know very well that many a man is better than
his system; but it seems to us inevitable that the logical pursuit of that
naturalistic principle leads to this dissolution of all solid fundamentals
of moral principles, and that it is but an inconsequence, certainly worthy
of honor and of notice, if all the advocates of naturalism do not profess
this dissolution of all moral principles with the same cynic frankness that
is shown by many of their partisans.

We do not say too much, when we charge ethical naturalism with dissolution
of _all_ moral principles. Let {382} us examine them, for a moment,
according to the old but still fundamental division into duty, virtue, and
highest good.

According to the principles of that ethical naturalism, there can be no
_duty_ at all, no objective moral law, binding absolutely and in general.
The motives of action are either the strongest and most durable instincts,
or, in case of high culture, conventional agreement of that which benefits
society. In the one as well as in the other case, when the duty is
neglected, the appeal is not made to something absolutely objective and
binding, but either to the highest instinct (and to this every individual
has the right to answer with a _Quod nego_), or to agreement and custom;
and as to this, every