ution theory against effacing
the differences between the moral and the natural, and against degrading
man to the level of animals on account of his connection with the animal
world. The naturo-historical idea of evolution, in case it should turn out
to be correct, would exercise an influence upon moral life in a three-fold
direction: First, it would add to all the motives of the humane treatment
of the animal world--which certainly without it already has moral
demands--a new one, and establish them all more firmly. Man would then
recognize in the animal world which surrounds him branches of his own
natural pedigree, and exercise his right of mastery only in the sense which
Alex. Braun expresses, when he says: "Man consents to the idea of being
appointed master of animals; but then he must also acknowledge that he is
not placed over his subjects as a stranger, but proceeded from the people
itself, whose master he wishes to be." A second service which the idea of
evolution would have to render to the forming of moral life, would consist
in the fact that it would favor all those ethical modes of contemplation
and those maxims which regard the gradual process of development and the
growth of character as the relative power of influences and conditions, and
that it would give them hints for the perception of moral growth, in like
manner as, in the before-mentioned parable, the Lord illustrates the
imperceptible and continual growth of the kingdom of God with the growth of
a plant. A third service which the evolution theory might be able {398} to
render to moral life, would consist in the fact that it would give to the
motive of perfection and progress, which is always and everywhere a moral
lever, a new illustration and a new weight by pointing at the progress
which development has to show in the life of nature.

* * * * * {399}

CONCLUSION.

If now, having reached our goal, we look back upon the way which we have
traversed, we find a justification of the regret expressed at the
beginning, that a scientific treatment of religion and morality is
compelled to take a position in regard to theories which are not yet
established. We found the most different problems--scientific,
naturo-philosophical, metaphysical, religious and ethical--inextricably
mixed, and were obliged, as one of our first tasks, to make an attempt at
finding the clew and at examining and testing each single problem, togethe