estion as to the relation of the evolution theories to religion,
the boundary-line can everywhere be easily drawn in theory and easily
observed in practice. For it is entirely natural for man to look upon the
phenomena of the visible world on the one hand, with a religious mind, as
works and actions of an almighty Creator and Ruler of the world, on the
other, with his observing and reflecting mind, as products of natural
causes. With this double view, man by no means feels {387} himself dragged
hither and thither between two conflicting views; he is able in his logical
contemplation of the world scientifically to establish and arrange each for
itself and both in their harmony, and has the full consciousness that the
one, like the other, has subjective as well as objective truth. Or, if a
single individual does not have this consciousness, he must at least admit
that it is not Darwinism primarily which created the difficulty of this
combined view of the world, but that the latter existed for man in the past
as well as in the present.

But the relation of the _Darwinian_ theories to ethical problems is quite a
different thing. Here, in the first place, it is not the same process which
is to be explained as well in regard to its natural conditions as to its
moral cause. It is true that this double view deserves attention in so far
as we can look upon every action which results from a moral determination
also in reference to its natural side. If I have to raise my arm in
consequence of a moral determination, then physiology and mechanism can
demonstrate with it the whole theory of the motion of members. But this is
not the question, when we treat of the relation between the natural and the
ethical. In this example, the moralist examines the motives of my action,
the scientist describes and explains the activity of the nerves and muscles
of my arm, and as long as the scientist is not guilty of going beyond the
boundary to which he is tempted, and which even now we are endeavoring to
make clear, as long as he does not include the ethical motives in his
physiological attempts at explanation, the one keeps himself neutral with
reference to the other; each of them knows that he is {388} operating in a
field which at first has nothing in common with that of the other. In a
moral action, _as such_, the question is no longer as to a process which is
to be explained as well in regard to its natural conditions as to its
ethical cause,