idence of the rapidity with
which, in many men who still do not wish consciously and certainly to be
thought godless (_i.e._, to be separated from God), their connection with
the source of light and life is decreasing, and of how strongly the fear
that they may be looked upon as unscientific and imperfectly educated,
overbalances the fear of losing the living God and Father, and therewith
the support of both mind and life.

Now, that this faith in a _special providence_, in a _hearing of prayer_,
and in _divine miracles_, forms an essential part of Christian
religiousness, we do not need to show more in detail; it is an established
historical fact, and an object of direct Christian knowledge. On the other
hand, we have still to say a word concerning {348} that which, on the part
of those just described, is so strongly contested; namely, about the
scientific worth of such a faith, and also about its reconcilableness with
the Darwinism theories.

In the first place, as to the faith in a _special providence of God_, and,
in connection with it, as to the possibility of _a hearing of human
prayer_, such a faith is by itself the inevitable consequence of all
theism; nay, it is precisely identical with theism; it is that which makes
theism _theism_, and distinguishes it from mere deism--_i.e._, from an idea
of God, which merely makes God the author of the world, and lets the world,
after it was once created, go its own way. Now, the theistic idea of God,
which sees the Creator in an uninterrupted connection with his creation, is
in itself the more scientific one: for a God who, although the author of
the world, would not know how to find, nor intend to find, a way of
communication with his creation, would certainly be an idea theologically
inconceivable. We should, therefore, still have to adhere to the idea of a
special providence of God, even if in our discursive reasoning and exact
investigation of the processes in the world we should not find a single
guide referring us to the scientific possibility of such a direct and
uninterrupted dependence of the world on its author. We should then have
simply to declare a conviction of the providence of God to be a postulate
of our reasoning, which is given with the idea of God itself; and would
just as little call this conviction unscientific on account of the fact,
that we are not able to show the modalities of divine providence, as in
reference to the exact sciences we should cont