FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219  
220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   >>   >|  
includes the final cause. Now the function of a thing is just what the thing is for. And what it is for is the same as its end, or final cause. {278} Therefore function is included in form. For example, the function of a hand, its power of gripping, is part of its form. And therefore, if it loses its function by being cut off from the arm, it likewise loses its form. Even the dead hand, of course, has some form, for every individual object is a compound of matter and form. But it has lost the highest part of its form, and relatively to the living hand it is mere matter, although, relatively to the flesh and bones of which it is composed, it is still form. Clearly, then, form is not merely shape. For the hand cut off does not lose its shape. The form includes all the qualities of the thing. The matter is what has the qualities. For the qualities are all universals. A piece of gold is yellow, and this means simply that it has this in common with other pieces of gold, and other yellow objects. To say that anything has a quality is immediately to place it in a class. And what the class has in common is a universal. A thing without qualities cannot exist, nor qualities without a thing. And this is the same as saying that form and matter cannot exist separately. The matter, then, is the absolutely formless. It is the substratum which underlies everything. It has, in itself, no character. It is absolutely featureless, indefinite, without any quality. Whatever gives a thing definiteness, character, quality, whatever makes it a this or that, is its form. Consequently, there are no differences within matter. One thing can only differ from another by having different qualities. And as matter has no qualities, it has no difference. And this in itself shows that the Aristotelian notion of matter is not the same as our notion of physical substance. For, according {279} to our modern usage, one kind of matter differs from another, as brass from iron. But this is a difference of quality, and for Aristotle all quality is part of the form. So in his view the difference of brass from iron is not a difference of matter, but a difference of form. Consequently, matter may become anything, according to the form impressed upon it. It is thus the possibility of everything, though it is actually nothing. It only becomes something by the acquisition of form. And this leads directly to a most important Aristotelian antithesis, that between po
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219  
220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
matter
 

qualities

 

difference

 
quality
 

function

 

common

 

includes

 

yellow

 

notion

 

Aristotelian


absolutely

 
Consequently
 

character

 
gripping
 
physical
 

substance

 

modern

 

differences

 

differs

 

differ


Aristotle

 

acquisition

 

directly

 

antithesis

 

important

 
possibility
 

included

 

impressed

 

simply

 

compound


objects

 

pieces

 
object
 

highest

 

Clearly

 

universals

 

living

 

individual

 

likewise

 

underlies


substratum
 
featureless
 

composed

 

Whatever

 

indefinite

 
formless
 

universal

 
Therefore
 
immediately
 

separately