nly moulds matter but produces it. If we assert that the one
primal reality is form, then clearly we must prove that all else in
the world, including matter, arises out of that prime being. Either
matter arises out of form or it does not. If it does, this arising
must be exhibited. If it does not, then form is not the sole ultimate
reality, for matter is equally an ultimate, underivative, {335}
primordial substance. In that case, we thus have two equally real
ultimate beings, each underived from the other, existing side by side
from all eternity. This is dualism, and this is the defect of
Aristotle. Not only does he not derive matter from form, but he
obviously sees no necessity for doing so. He would probably have
protested against any attempt to do so, for, when he identifies the
formal, final, and efficient causes with each other, leaving out the
material cause, this is equivalent to an assertion that matter cannot
be reduced to form. Thus his dualism is deliberate and persistent. The
world, says Aristotle, is composed of matter and form. Where does this
matter come from? As it does not, in his system, arise out of form, we
can only conclude that its being is wholly in itself, i.e., that it is
a substance, an absolute reality. And this is utterly inconsistent
with Aristotle's assertion that it is in itself nothing but a mere
potentiality. Thus, in the last resort, this dualism of sense and
thought, of matter and Idea, of unlimited and limiting, which runs,
"the little rift within the lute," through all Greek philosophy, is
not resolved. The world is not explained, because it is not derived
from a single principle. If form be the Absolute, the whole world must
flow out of it. In Aristotle's system, it does not.

Secondly, is the principle of form self-explanatory? Here, again, we
must answer negatively. Most of what was said of Plato under this head
applies equally to Aristotle. Plato asserted that the Absolute is
reason, and it was therefore incumbent on him to show that his account
of reason was truly rational. He failed to do so. Aristotle asserts
the same thing, for form is only {336} another word for reason. Hence
he must show us that this form is a rational principle, and this means
that he must show us that it is necessary. But he fails to do so. How
is form a necessary and self-determining principle? Why should there
be such a principle as form? We cannot see any necessity. It is a mere
fact. It is nothing but