r for him to discriminate next
time.
Aristotle attempts no systematic classification of the virtues, as
Plato had done. This sort of schematism is contrary to the practical
character of his thought. He sees that life is far too complex to be
treated in this way. The proper mean is different in every different
case, and therefore there are as many virtues as there are
circumstances in life. His list of virtues, therefore, is not intended
to be exhaustive. It is merely illustrative. Though the number of
virtues is infinite, there are certain well-recognized kinds of good
action, which are of such constant importance in life that they have
received names. By the example of some of these virtues Aristotle
illustrates his doctrine of the mean. For instance, courage is the
mean between cowardice and rashness. That is to say, cowardice is the
defect of boldness, rashness the excess, courage the reasonable
medium. Munificence is the mean between pettiness and vulgar
profusion, good temper between spiritlessness and irascibility,
politeness between rudeness and obsequiousness, modesty between
shamelessness and bashfulness, temperance between insensibility and
intemperance.
Justice hardly comes into the scheme; it is rather a virtue of the
State than of the individual, and it has been thought by some that the
book devoted to it in the "Ethics" has been misplaced. Justice is of
two kinds, distributive and corrective. Its fundamental idea {320} is
the assignment of advantages and disadvantages according to merit.
Distributive justice assigns honours and rewards according to the
worth of the individuals involved. Corrective justice has to do with
punishment. If a man improperly obtains an advantage, things must be
equalized by the imposition on him of a corresponding disadvantage.
Justice, however, is a general principle, and no general principle is
equal to the complexity of life. Special cases cannot be foreseen, The
necessary adjustment of human relations arising from this cause is
equity.
Aristotle is a pronounced supporter of the freedom of the will. He
censures Socrates because the latter's theory of virtue practically
amounts to a denial of freedom. According to Socrates, whoever thinks
right must necessarily do right. But this is equivalent to denying a
man's power to choose evil. And if he cannot choose evil, he cannot
choose good. For the right-thinking man does not do right voluntarily,
but necessarily. Aristotle
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