ysis of the
rationale even of familiar distinctions. For instance, his Relation
properly includes Action, Passivity, and Local Situation, and also the
two categories of Position [Greek: pote] and [Greek: pou], while the
difference between [Greek: pou] and [Greek: keisthai] is only verbal,
and [Greek: echein] is not a _summum genus_ at all. Besides--only
substantives and attributes being there considered--there is no category
for sensation and other mental states, since, though these may rightly
be placed, so far as they express their relation, if active, to their
objects, if passive to their causes, in the Categories of Actio and
Passio, the things, viz., the mental states, do not belong there.

The absence of a well-defined concrete name answering to the abstract
_existence_, is one great obstacle to renewing Aristotle's attempt. The
words used for the purpose commonly denote substances only, though
attributes and feelings are equally existences. Even _being_ is
inadequate, since it denotes only _some_ existences, being used by
custom as synonymous with _substance_, both material and spiritual. That
is, it is applied to what excites feelings and has attributes, but not
to feelings and attributes themselves; and if we called extension,
virtue, &c., _beings_, we should be accused of believing in the Platonic
self-existing ideas, or Epicurus's sensible forms--in short, of deeming
attributes substances. To fill this gap, the abstract, _entity_, was
made into a concrete, equivalent to _being_. Yet even _entity_ implies,
though not so much as _being_, the notion of substance. In fact, every
word originally connoting simply existence, gradually enlarges its
connotation to mean _separate_ existence, i.e. existence freed from the
condition of belonging to a substance, so as to exclude attributes and
feelings. Since, then, all the terms are ambiguous, that among them (and
the same principle applies to terms generally) will be employed here
which seems on each occasion to be _least_ ambiguous: and terms will be
used even in improper senses, when these by familiar association convey
the proper meaning.

_Nameable things_ are--I. Feelings or States of Consciousness.--A
feeling, being anything of which the mind is conscious, is synonymous
with _state of consciousness_. It is commonly confined to the sensations
and emotions, or to the emotions alone; but it is properly a genus,
having for species, Sensation, Emotion, Thought, and Vo