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l antecedent and its consequent seem _conceivable_, has perpetually varied, since it depends on a person's special habits of thought. Thus, the Greeks, Thales, Anaximenes, and Pythagoras, thought respectively that water, air, or number is such an agency explaining the production of physical effects. Many moderns, again, have been unable to _conceive_ the production of effects by volition itself, without some intervening agency to connect it with them. This medium, Leibnitz thought, was some _per se_ efficient physical antecedent; while the Cartesians imagined for the purpose the theory of Occasional Causes, that is, supposed that God, not _qua_ mind, or _qua_ volition, but _qua_ omnipotent, intervenes to connect the volition and the motion: so far is the mind from being forced to think the action of mind on matter more _natural_ than that of matter on matter. Those who believe volition to be an efficient cause are guilty of exactly the same error as the Greeks, or Leibnitz or Descartes; that is, of requiring an _explanation_ of physical sequences by something [Greek: aneu hou to aition ouk an pot' eie aition]. But they are guilty of another error also, in inferring that volition, even if it is an _efficient_ cause of so peculiar a phenomenon as nervous action, must therefore be the efficient cause of all other phenomena, though having scarcely a single circumstance in common with them. CHAPTER VI. THE COMPOSITION OF CAUSES. An effect is almost always the result of the concurrence of several causes. When all have their full effect, precisely as if they had operated _successively_, the joint effect (and it is not inconsistent to give the name of _joint effect_ even to the mutual obliteration of the separate ones) may be _deduced_ from the laws which govern the causes when acting separately. Sciences in which, as in mechanics, this principle, viz. the _composition of causes_, prevails, are deductive and demonstrative. Phenomena, in effect, do generally follow this principle. But in some classes, e.g. chemical, vital, and mental phenomena, the laws of the elements when called on to work together, cease and give place to others, so that the joint effect is not the sum of the separate effects. Yet even here the more general principle is exemplified. For the new _heteropathic_ laws, besides that they never supersede _all_ the old laws (thus, The weight of a chemical compound is equal to the sum of the weight of t
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