ch are true in the absence of all
modifying causes, as though no such causes _could_ exist. Other
analogous fallacies are those _a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum
quid_ (the converse of the preceding), and _a dicto secundum quid ad
dictum secundum alterum quid_.
CHAPTER VII.
FALLACIES OF CONFUSION.
Under this head come all fallacies which arise, not so much from a false
estimate of the probative force of known evidence, as from an indistinct
conception what the evidence is.
1. Thus, where there is an ambiguous middle, or a term used in different
senses in the premisses and in the conclusion, the argument proceeds as
though there were evidence to the point, when, in fact, there is none.
This error does not occur much in direct inductions, since the things
themselves are there present to the senses or memory; but chiefly, in
Ratiocination, where we are deciphering our own or others' notes. The
ambiguity arises very often from assuming that a word corresponds
precisely in meaning with the root itself (e.g. _representative_), or
with cognate words from the same root, called _paronymous_ words (as,
_artful_, with _art_). Other examples of ambiguities are; 'Money,'
which, meaning both the currency and also capital seeking investment, is
often thought to be scarce in the former sense, because scarce in the
latter; 'Influence of Property,' which, signifying equally the influence
of respect for the power for good, and of fear of the power for evil,
which is possessed by the rich, is represented as being assailed under
its former form when attacked really only under the latter; 'Theory,'
which, because applied popularly to the accounting for an effect apart
from facts, is ridiculed, even when expressing, as it properly does, the
result of philosophical induction from experience; 'The Church,' which
refers (as in the question of the inviolability of _Church_ property)
sometimes to the clergy alone, sometimes to all its members; 'Good,' in
the Stoic argument that virtue, as alone _good_ (in the Stoic sense),
must therefore include freedom and beauty, because these are _good_ (in
the popular sense). So, the meaning of 'I' shifts from _the laws of my
nature_ to _my will_, in Descartes' _a priori_ argument for the being of
a God, viz. that there must be an external archetype whence I got the
conception, for if _I_ (i.e. _the laws of my nature_) made it, _I_ (i.e.
_my will_, and not, as it should consistently be, _
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