rresponding negative, for the
non-possession of an attribute is itself an attribute. Names negative in
form, e.g. unpleasant, are often really positive; and others, e.g. idle,
sober, though seemingly positive, are really negative. Privatives are
names which are equivalent each to a positive and a negative name taken
together. They connote both the absence of certain attributes, and the
presence of others, whence the presence of the defaulting ones might
have been expected. Thus, blind would be applied only to a non-seeing
member of a seeing class.
The _fifth_ division is into Relative and (that we may economise the
term Absolute for an occasion when none other is available) Non-relative
names. Correlatives, when concrete, are of course connotative. A
relation arises from two individuals being concerned in the same series
of facts, so that the signification of neither name can be explained
except by mentioning another: and any two correlatives connote, not the
same attribute indeed, but just this series of facts, which is exactly
the same in both cases.
Some make a _sixth_ division, viz. Univocals, i.e. names predicated of
different individuals in the same sense, and AEquivocals, i.e. names
predicated of different individuals in different senses. But these are
not two kinds of names, but only two modes of using them; for an
aequivocal name is two names accidentally coinciding in sound. An
intermediate case is that of a name used analogically or metaphorically,
that is, in two senses, one its primary, the other its secondary sense.
The not perceiving that such a word is really two has produced many
fallacies.
CHAPTER III.
THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES.
Logic is the theory of Proof, and everything provable can be exhibited
as a proposition, propositions alone being objects of belief. Therefore,
the import of propositions, that is, the import of predication, must be
ascertained. But, as to make a proposition, i.e. to predicate, is to
assert one _thing_ of another _thing_, the way to learn the import of
predication is, by discovering what are the _things_ signified by names
which are capable of being subject or predicate. It was with this object
that Aristotle formed his Categories, i.e. an attempted enumeration of
all nameable things by the _summa genera_ or highest predicates, one or
other of which must, he asserted, be predicable of everything. His,
however, is a rude catalogue, without philosophical anal
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