ial than the knowledge
of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and
turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels. Therefore the
knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of Christ's soul.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus,
Who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of
death, crowned with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that
Christ is said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the
suffering of death. And hence, not in knowledge.

_I answer that,_ The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be
looked at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the
inflowing cause; secondly, as regards what it has from the subject
receiving it. Now with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted
upon the soul of Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the
angels, both in the number of things known and in the certainty of
the knowledge; since the spiritual light, which is imprinted on the
soul of Christ, is much more excellent than the light which pertains
to the angelic nature. But as regards the second, the knowledge
imprinted on the soul of Christ is less than the angelic knowledge,
in the manner of knowing that is natural to the human soul, i.e. by
turning to phantasms, and by comparison and discursion.

And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 11, Art. 5]

Whether This Knowledge Was Habitual?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual
knowledge. For it has been said (Q. 9, A. 1) that the highest
perfection of knowledge befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of
an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially
or habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to
know all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual
knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now,
since Christ knew all things, as was said (Q. 10, A. 2), He could not
have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another,
since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore
the habitual knowledge of certain things would have been useless to
Him--which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a
habitual knowledge of what He knew.

Obj. 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the