intellect
immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be
received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but
finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the
intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ
knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by
discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity, i.e. in any
creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally
in the Word Himself.
Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite
in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a
surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there
were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity,
i.e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite,
since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But
what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the
First Part (Q. 7, A. 2). Now the proper object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as is said _De Anima_ iii, 26, to which pertains
the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has
a finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is
simply infinite in essence, as stated above (A. 1). But the infinite
in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul
of Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its
essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect
understands a universal--for example, the nature of a genus or
species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be
predicated of an infinite number.
Reply Obj. 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but one.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2, 3) that, since bodies have
dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies.
Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder
the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to
suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite
breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is
accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher
says (Phys. iii, 37, 38); as the infinite is multiplied by different
subjects, so, too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in
such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that
particular subject. Now it is a property of
|