ure with the Divine took
place in the Person, as is clear from Q. 2, A. 2. Now, according to
some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the union," whereby
Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully
than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two
natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ,
but one only, pertaining to both natures.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the
perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the
sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh." But created
knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was
created knowledge.
_I answer that,_ As said above (Q. 5), the Son of God assumed an
entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not
only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved
Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account
of the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in
potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a
tablet on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon
through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as
is said _De Anima_ iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect
unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should
assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole
human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence
it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which
would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that
there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine
knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more
imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because, since
everything is on account of its operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17,
Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had
not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge.
Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the
human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles;
since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human
intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took
the whole human nature, as stated above (Q. 5). And hence the Sixth
Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the
opinion of th
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