concentrate and hazard a decision. It cannot be said we forced
the fatal move upon him intentionally. It was rather the operation of
strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. We were determined
that his threat of invasion, formidable as it was, should not force upon us
so close a concentration as to leave our widespread interests open to his
attack. Neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent his
attempting to concentrate. Every one of his naval ports was watched by a
squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent concentration.
The escape of one division might well break the chain. But that
consideration made no difference. The distribution of our squadrons before
his naval ports was essential for preventing sporadic action. Their
distribution was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of
colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to exercise a general
command even if we could not destroy the enemy's force.

The whole of Nelson's correspondence for this period shows that his main
object was the protection of our Mediterranean trade and of Neapolitan and
Turkish territory. When Villeneuve escaped him, his irritation was caused
not by the prospect of a French concentration, which had no anxieties for
him, for he knew counter-concentrations were provided for. It was caused
rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to concentrate
had placed within his reach. He followed Villeneuve to the West Indies, not
to prevent concentration, but, firstly, to protect the local trade and
Jamaica, and secondly, in hope of another chance of dealing the blow he had
missed. Lord Barham took precisely the same view. When on news of
Villeneuve's return from the West Indies he moved out the three divisions
of the Western Squadron, that is, the Ushant concentration, to meet him, he
expressly stated, not that his object was to prevent concentration, but
that it was to deter the French from attempting sporadic action. "The
interception of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to Europe
would be a greater object than any I know. It would damp all future
expeditions, and would show to Europe that it might be advisable to relax
in the blockading system occasionally for the express purpose of putting
them in our hands at a convenient opportunity."

Indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's concentration. It was
our best chance of solving effectually t