wn judgment of the fitness of the candidates; finally,
although all were inflexibly honest, all accurately informed of the
wishes of their constituents, yet under the present mode of election a
minority may often elect a President, and when this happens it may
reasonably be expected that efforts will be made on the part of the
majority to rectify this injurious operation of their institutions. But
although no evil of this character should result from such a perversion
of the first principle of our system--_that the majority is to
govern_--it must be very certain that a President elected by a minority
can not enjoy the confidence necessary to the successful discharge of
his duties.

In this as in all other matters of public concern policy requires that
as few impediments as possible should exist to the free operation of the
public will. Let us, then, endeavor so to amend our system that the
office of Chief Magistrate may not be conferred upon any citizen but in
pursuance of a fair expression of the will of the majority.

I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as may
remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and
Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each
State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the
first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice
between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment
it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to
a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be
adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying
for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may
have devolved would not be proper.

While members of Congress can be constitutionally appointed to offices
of trust and profit it will be the practice, even under the most
conscientious adherence to duty, to select them for such stations as
they are believed to be better qualified to fill than other citizens;
but the purity of our Government would doubtless be promoted by their
exclusion from all appointments in the gift of the President, in whose
election they may have been officially concerned. The nature of the
judicial office and the necessity of securing in the Cabinet and in
diplomatic stations of the highest rank the best talents and political
experience should, perhaps, except these from the ex