oinsett it is proper to say that my immediate
compliance with the application for his recall and the appointment of a
successor are not to be ascribed to any evidence that the imputation of
an improper interference by him in the local politics of Mexico was well
founded, nor to a want of confidence in his talents or integrity, and to
add that the truth of that charge has never been affirmed by the federal
Government of Mexico in its communications with this.

I consider it one of the most urgent of my duties to bring to your
attention the propriety of amending that part of our Constitution which
relates to the election of President and Vice-President. Our system of
government was by its framers deemed an experiment, and they therefore
consistently provided a mode of remedying its defects.

To the people belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate; it
was never designed that their choice should in any case be defeated,
either by the intervention of electoral colleges or by the agency
confided, under certain contingencies, to the House of Representatives.
Experience proves that in proportion as agents to execute the will of
the people are multiplied there is danger of their wishes being
frustrated. Some may be unfaithful; all are liable to err. So far,
therefore, as the people can with convenience speak, it is safer for
them to express their own will.

The number of aspirants to the Presidency and the diversity of the
interests which may influence their claims leave little reason to expect
a choice in the first instance, and in that event the election must
devolve on the House of Representatives, where it is obvious the will of
the people may not be always ascertained, or, if ascertained, may not be
regarded. From the mode of voting by States the choice is to be made by
24 votes, and it may often occur that one of these will be controlled by
an individual Representative. Honors and offices are at the disposal of
the successful candidate. Repeated ballotings may make it apparent that
a single individual holds the cast in his hand. May he not be tempted to
name his reward? But even without corruption, supposing the probity of
the Representative to be proof against the powerful motives by which it
may be assailed, the will of the people is still constantly liable to be
misrepresented. One may err from ignorance of the wishes of his
constituents; another from a conviction that it is his duty to be
governed by his o