opinions my constitutional
advisers may suggest and which I shall be satisfied are reconcilable
with my official duties.

With these views, I ask the opinion of the Senate upon the following
questions:

Will the Senate advise the conclusion of a treaty with the Choctaw
Nation according to the terms which they propose? Or will the Senate
advise the conclusion of a treaty with that tribe as modified by the
alterations suggested by me? If not, what further alteration or
modification will the Senate propose?

I am fully aware that in thus resorting to the early practice of the
Government, by asking the previous advice of the Senate in the discharge
of this portion of my duties, I am departing from a long and for many
years an unbroken usage in similar cases. But being satisfied that this
resort is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, that it is
strongly recommended in this instance by considerations of expediency,
and that the reasons which have led to the observance of a different
practice, though very cogent in negotiations with foreign nations, do
not apply with equal force to those made with Indian tribes, I flatter
myself that it will not meet the disapprobation of the Senate. Among the
reasons for a previous expression of the views of the Senate the
following are stated as most prominent:

1. The Indians have requested that their propositions should be
submitted to the Senate.

2. The opinion of the Senate in relation to the terms to be proposed
will have a salutary effect in a future negotiation, if one should be
deemed proper.

3. The Choctaw is one of the most numerous and powerful tribes within
our borders, and as the conclusion of a treaty with them may have a
controlling effect upon other tribes it is important that its terms
should be well considered. Those now proposed by the Choctaws, though
objectionable, it is believed are susceptible of modifications which
will leave them conformable to the humane and liberal policy which the
Government desires to observe toward the Indian tribes, and be at the
same time acceptable to them. To be possessed of the views of the Senate
on this important and delicate branch of our future negotiations would
enable the President to act much more effectively in the exercise of his
particular functions. There is also the best reason to believe that
measures in this respect emanating from the united counsel of the
treaty-making power would be more satisfactor