than change the
inequality from one quarter to another.
Thus viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend
the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds,
which may at any time remain in the Treasury after the national debt
shall have been paid, among the States, in proportion to the number of
their Representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal
improvement.
Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it
has also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A
brief notice of these objections here will not, therefore, I trust, be
regarded as out of place.
They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following
grounds: First, an objection to the ratio of distribution; second, an
apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce
improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution;
third, that the mode proposed would lead to the construction of works of
a local nature, to the exclusion of such as are general and as would
consequently be of a more useful character; and, last, that it would
create a discreditable and injurious dependence on the part of the State
governments upon the Federal power. Of those who object to the ratio of
representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the
importations of the respective States would constitute one that would be
more equitable; and others again, that the extent of their respective
territories would furnish a standard which would be more expedient and
sufficiently equitable. The ratio of representation presented itself to
my mind, and it still does, as one of obvious equity, because of its
being the ratio of contribution, whether the funds to be distributed be
derived from the customs or from direct taxation. It does not follow,
however, that its adoption is indispensable to the establishment of the
system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the subject
which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of
contribution proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of
distribution be confined to one ground. It may, if in the judgment of
those whose right it is to fix it be deemed politic and just to give
it that character, have regard to several.
In my first message I stated it to be my opinion that "it is not
probable that any adjustment of the tariff upon principles satisfactory
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