nd brought
home almost to your own doors, congress may establish a place, or places,
at either the extremes, center or outer parts of the states; at a time and
season, too, when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these
means destroy the rights of election. But in opposition to this reasoning,
it is asserted, that it is a necessary power, because the states might
omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of
that branch of the government; this is what logicians call _argumentum
absurdum_; for the different states, if they will have any security at all
in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and
they, therefore, would be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it
dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution. Besides,
if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that
provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other
duties of the several state legislatures? To exemplify this, the states
are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the
time is to be under the direction of congress. Now, suppose they were to
omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to
appoint the time, which might well be apprehended, as the omission of
regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives,
provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all; of
course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise. And from this
motive or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely
in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them,
which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support,
or at least resting on their bounty. To this the advocates for this system
oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that
congress will abuse this power; but such language, as relative to so
important a subject, is mere vapor, and formed without sense. Is it not in
their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to
you? It must be admitted, because the words are unlimited in their sense.
It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to suppose that what
may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to
suppose that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress
will be made for holding an election for the whole state at Poughke
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