ary notwithstanding." When this clause was
introduced, it was not established that inferior continental courts should
be appointed for trial of all questions arising on treaties and on the
laws of the general government, and it was my wish and hope that every
question of that kind would have been determined in the first instance in
the courts of the respective states; had this been the case, the propriety
and the necessity that treaties duly made and ratified, and the laws of
the general government, should be binding on the state judiciaries which
were to decide upon them, must be evident to every capacity, while at the
same time, if such treaties or laws were inconsistent with our
constitution and bill of rights, the judiciaries of this state would be
bound to reject the first and abide by the last, since in the form I
introduced the clause, notwithstanding treaties and the laws of the
general government were intended to be superior to the laws of our state
government, where they should be opposed to each other, yet that they were
not proposed nor meant to be superior to our constitution and bill of
rights. It was afterwards altered and amended (if it can be called an
amendment) to the form in which it stands in the system now published, and
as inferior continental, and not state courts, are originally to decide on
those questions, it is now worse than useless, for being so altered as to
render the treaties and laws made under the general government superior to
our constitution, if the system is adopted it will amount to a total and
unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens of this state,
of every right and privilege secured to them by our constitution, and an
express compact and stipulation with the general government that it may,
at its discretion, make laws in direct violation of those rights. But on
this subject I shall enlarge in a future number.

That I "voted an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United
States, for the correction of all errors both in law and fact," in
rendering judgment is most true, and it is equally true that if it had
been so ordained by the Constitution, the supreme judiciary would only
have had an appellate jurisdiction, of the same nature with that possessed
by our high court of appeals, and could not in any respect intermeddle
with any fact decided by a jury; but as the clause now stands, an appeal
being given in general terms from the inferior courts, both