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s of the strange message read off by our signal officers from the waving flags of the Confederates in plain sight on the crest of Three Top Mountain.(2) This message purported to have been sent by Longstreet to Early. "Be ready," it said, "to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan." The true story of this despatch has not until now been made public,(3) and many are the surmises, clever or stupid, that have been wasted upon the mystery. In fact, the message was, as both Sheridan and Wright naturally inferred, a trick intended to deceive them; Early thought to induce them to move back without waiting for the attack which, with his reduced strength, he wished to avoid. The effect was to put the Union commanders on their guard against what was actually about to happen. Therefore Sheridan instantly turned back all the cavalry save one regiment, which he kept for an escort, and rode on to Rectortown, and so went by rail to Washington--first, however, taking the precaution to warn Wright to strengthen his position, to close in Powell from Front Royal, to look well to the ground, and to be prepared. In his official report of the campaign, Sheridan, speaking of the events now to be related, said: "This surprise was owing probably to not closing in Powell or that the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed at the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was but little danger of attack." But it is important to observe and remember that although Wright, in sending Longstreet's message, had remarked-- "If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry he might, by turning my right, give us a great deal of trouble. . . . I shall only fear an attack on my right," yet Sheridan in his reply made no allusion to any difference of opinion on his part as to the place of danger. His instructions to close in Powell, Torbert, under Wright's direction, executed by calling in Moore's brigade to cover Buckton's Ford, on the left and rear of Crook. Powell, with the rest of his division, was left at Front Royal to hold off Lomax. Sheridan went on to Washington. Arriving there on the morning of the 17th, he at once asked for a special train to take him to Martinsburg at noon, and having, between a late breakfast and an early luncheon, transacted all his business at the War Office, including the conversion of the government to his views, set out to rejoin his command. W
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