ith him went two engineer officers,
Alexander and Thom, with whom he was to consult as to the best
point, if any, in the lower valley to be fortified and held; for
this venerable error was not dead, merely sleeping.
Torbert rejoined the army at Cedar Creek on the 16th, and Merritt
took up his old position on the right. On the same night Rosser
took one of his brigades with a brigade of infantry mounted behind
the horsemen, and, supported by the whole of Early's army, set out
to capture the outlying brigade of Custer's division, but found
instead a single troop on picket duty. This he took, but it was
a rather mortifying issue to his heavy preparations and great
expectations, and a long price to pay for putting Torbert on the
alert.
For the next two days nothing was seen of Early, although the
cavalry and both of the infantry corps of the main line kept a good
watch toward the front. There was some probability that Early
would attack, especially if he should have heard of Wright's
departure and not of his return. That Early must either attack
soon or withdraw to the head of the valley was certain, for Sheridan
had stripped the country of the supplies on which the Confederates
had been accustomed to rely, and Early had now to feed his men and
animals by the long haul of seventy-five miles from Staunton. It
was thus that Wright viewed the situation, and in fact the same
things were passing through the mind of Early. On the 18th of
October, Crook, by Wright's orders, sent Harris with his brigade
of Thoburn's division, to find out where Early really was and what
he was doing. How far Harris went is not certainly known, but when
he returned at nightfall he reported that he had been to Early's
old camps and found them evacuated. In reality Early was at Fisher's
Hill with his whole force, engaged in his last preparations for
the surprise of the morrow, but the report brought back by Harris
soon spread as a camp rumor among the officers and men of Crook,
so that they may have slept that night without thought of danger
near, and even the vigilance of their picket line, as well as that
of the cavalry to whom they largely looked for protection against
a surprise, may or may not have been inopportunely relaxed.
For Early, warned of the strength of Sheridan's right, by the
failure of Rosser's adventure, had since been studying the chances
of an attack on the opposite flank. To this indeed the very
difficulty of the a
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