l consideration of all the authorities, is that when the
battle began, Wright commanded an effective force of not more than
31,000 officers and men of all arms, made up of 9,000 in the Sixth
Corps, 9,500 in the Nineteenth Corps, 6,000 in Crook's command,
and 6,500 cavalry. The infantry probably numbered 23,000: Ricketts
8,500, Emory 9,000, Crook 5,500. Of these, therefore, the hard
fighting fell on 17,500. The losses in the Sixth and Nineteenth
Corps, nearly all incurred in the early morning, being about 4,500,
the two corps should have mustered 13,500 for the counter-attack
of the afternoon, yet the ground they then stood upon, from the
road to the brook, measures barely 7,400 feet. With all allowances,
therefore, Sheridan cannot have taken more than 8,000 of his infantry
into this attack. This leaves out Crook's men bodily, and calls
for 5,500 unrepentant stragglers from the ranks of Emory and Wright
--one man in three. After all is said, unhappily there is nothing
so extraordinary in this, but strange indeed would it have been if
many of these skulkers had come back into the fight, as Sheridan
considerately declares they did.

As to Early's force, the difficulty of coming to a positive conclusion
is even greater. General Early himself says he went into the battle
with but 8,800 muskets. General Dawes, perhaps the most accomplished
statistician of the war, makes the total present for duty 22,000;
of these 15,000 would be infantry. The figures presented by the
unprejudiced statistician of the "Century War Book" (11) call for
15,000 of all arms. Of these 10,000 would be infantry.

Early may be said to have accomplished the ultimate object of his
attack at Cedar Creek, yet at a fearful cost, for although all
thought of transferring any part of Sheridan's force to the James
was for the moment given up, on the other hand Early had completed
the destruction (12) of his prestige, had suffered an irreparable
diminution of numbers, and had seen his army almost shaken to
pieces.

Grant once more returned to his favorite project of a movement in
force on Charlottesville and Gordonsville, but Sheridan continuing
to oppose the scheme tenaciously, it came to nothing. His own
plan, eventually carried out, was to hold the lower valley in
sufficient strength, and to move against the line of the Virginia
Central railway with all his cavalry. The rails of the Manassas
Gap line, so often relaid, were once more and for th