s
report that it was twice repulsed by the 5th Texas and Waller's
battalion, under Green, and the 28th Louisiana, Colonel Gray, aided
by the guns of Semmes's battery and the Valverde battery. However,
the counter-movement on the part of the Confederates, being begun
in plain view, was instantly seen, and Banks sent word to Weitzel
to check it. With this object, Weitzel ordered the 114th New York
to go to the support of the 75th. A brisk fight followed, without
material advantage to either side. In truth, the canebrake formed
an impenetrable obstacle to the combatants, who, when once they
had passed within the outer edge of the tangle, were unable either
to see or approach one another, although the struggle was plainly
visible from the front of both armies.
The reserve of Parrott guns, manned by the 1st Indiana and composed
of four 30-pounders and four 20-pounders, was posted under McMillan
to cover the left flank and the broken centre where it was pierced
by the bayou, as well as to watch for the return of the _Diana_ to
activity. Toward evening the remaining guns of the 1st Indiana,
two 12-pounder rifles under Cox, after being posted in support of
the centre, were sent to the left to assist Bainbridge and Carruth,
whose ammunition was giving out.
Banks, after gaining advanced positions in contact with the enemy,
forbore to press them hard because, as has been seen, his whole
purpose was to hold the Confederates where they stood until he
could hear of Grover or from Grover. As the day advanced without
news or the long-expected sound of Grover's guns, Banks began to
grow impatient and to fear that the adventure from which so much
had been hoped had somehow miscarried. He therefore became even
more anxious than before lest the Confederates should move off
under cover of the coming night. Accordingly, during the afternoon,
although it had been his previous purpose not to deliver an assault
until certain that Grover held the Confederate line of retreat,
Banks gave discretionary orders to Emory and Weitzel to form for
an attack and move upon the Confederate works if a favorable
opportunity should present itself. The exercise of this discretion
in turn devolved upon the commanders of the front line, that is,
upon Weitzel and Paine, for Gooding, being out of communication,
except by signal, with the troops on the west bank, was occupied
in conforming to their movements. Paine and Weitzel, after
conferring, reso
|