nt
hard on the spit; then, after a half hour of ineffectual exertion,
lying alone and helpless under the concentrated aim of the Confederate
batteries, she was abandoned and set on fire by her captain. About
three in the morning, becoming lighter, as the fire did its work,
she floated free and drifted down the stream one mass of flames,
in plain view, not merely of the fleet, but also of the army,
condemned to stand to arms in sight and sound of the distant battle
and now to look on idly as, with a mighty flash and roar, the
_Mississippi_ cast to the heavens her blazing timbers, amid a myriad
of bursting shells, in one mountain of flame: then black silence.
Thus, when at last the gray of the morning came, the _Hartford_
and _Albatross_ rode in safety above Port Hudson, while the _Richmond,
Monongahela, Genesee_, and _Kineo_, all battered and more or less
injured, lay at anchor once more near Prophet Island, and the
_Mississippi_ had perished in a blaze of glory.
Narrowly escaping the total failure of his plans and the destruction
of his fleet, Farragut had so far succeeded in his objects that
henceforth the Confederates practically lost the control of the
Mississippi above Port Hudson, as well as the use of the Red River
as their base of supplies. Save in skiff-loads, beef, corn, and
salt could no longer be safely carried across the Mississippi, and
the high road from Galveston and Matamoras was closed against the
valuable and sorely needed cargoes brought from Europe by the
blockade runners.
As for the army, it had gained some facility of movement, some
knowledge of its deficiencies, and some information of great future
value as to the topography of the unknown country about Port Hudson;
more than this could hardly have been expected. Indeed, the sole
object of the presence of the army was defeated by the movement of
the fleet so many hours before the time agreed upon. This object
was to make a diversion that might attract the enemy's attention
and thus tend to reduce the fire of musketry on the exposed decks
of the fleet, and to draw off or hold off the fire of the
field-pieces that might otherwise be massed on the river front.
The disparity between the relative strength of Banks's army and
that of the garrison was too well known to justify the thought of
an actual attack upon the works.
Such, however, was not the opinion of the government, which to the
last seems to have taken for granted that all that
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