constant work of their officers. The degree of instruction and
care then apparent forecast the value of their actual service.
The 38th Massachusetts and 116th New York were specially commended
in orders.
To hold Baton Rouge about 3,000 men were detached, under Chickering,
including the 41st Massachusetts, 173d New York, 175th New York,
1st Indiana heavy artillery, 3d Louisiana native guards, Mack's
battery, and Troop F of the Rhode Island cavalry.
All arrangements being concerted for the passage of the batteries
on the evening of the 14th of March, Grover set out on the afternoon
of the 13th, followed, at daybreak the next morning, by Emory, with
Augur bringing up the rear. In the afternoon Grover went into
camp, covering the intersection of the Bayou Sara road and the road
that leads from it toward the river. Emory formed on his left,
covering the branches of this road that lead to Springfield Landing
and to Ross Landing, his main body supporting the centre at
Alexander's plantation. Augur, on the right, held the cross-road
that leads from the Bayou Sara road by Alexander's to the Clinton
road at Vallandigham's. At two o'clock in the afternoon the signal
officers opened communication from Springfield Landing with the
fleet at anchor near the head of Prophet Island, and a strong
detachment was posted near the landing to maintain the connection.
As the Confederates were known to have a force of about 1,200
cavalry somewhere between Clinton and Baton Rouge, strong detachments
became necessary to observe all the approaches and to hold the
roads and bridges in the rear in order to secure the withdrawal of
the army when the demonstration should be completed, as well as to
guard the operation from being inopportunely interrupted. These
dispositions reduced the force for battle to about 12,000.
It had been intended to concentrate nearly all the artillery near
the river in the vicinity of Ross Landing in such a manner as to
engage, or at least divide, the attention of the lower batteries
of Port Hudson; but the maps were even more imperfect than usual,
and when a reconnoissance, naturally retarded by the enemy's advance
guard, showed that the road by which the guns were to have gone
into position did not exist, the daylight was already waning. A
broken bridge also caused some delay.
At five o'clock in the afternoon Banks received a despatch from
Farragut announcing an important change in the hour fixed for t
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