ut. O. M. Poe of the engineers, made a reconnoissance on the
enemy's front, which served to lead McClellan to believe the enemy's
"intrenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in
position to command the front approaches, and that a direct assault
would result in heavy and unnecessary loss of life."

This belief, he says, determined him to make an effort to turn the
enemy's flank and attack him in the rear.

Rosecrans, however, has the honor of submitting, about 10 P.M. of
the night of July 10th, a plan for turning the enemy's position,
which, with some reluctance, McClellan directed him to carry out.

Rosecrans' brigade consisted of the 8th, 10th, and 13th Indiana,
19th Ohio and Burdsell's company of cavalry, numbering in all 1917
men.

The plan proposed by Rosecrans and approved by McClellan was first
suggested by a young man by the name of Hart, whose father's house
stood on the pike near the summit of Rich Mountain, two miles in
the rear of Pegram's position. Young Hart had been driven from home
by the presence of Confederates, and was eager to do what he could
for the Union cause. He sought Rosecrans, and proposed to lead
him by an unfrequented route around the enemy's _left_, and under
cover of the dense timber, by a considerable circuit, to the crest
of Rich Mountain, thence to the road at his old home in the enemy's
rear. He so impressed himself on Rosecrans and those around him
as to secure their confidence in him and his plan. In arranging
details it was ordered that Rosecrans, guided by Hart, should, at
daylight of the 11th, leave the main road about one mile in front
of the enemy's fortifications, keep under cover of the declivities
of the mountain spurs, avoid using an axe or anything to make a
noise, reach the road at the mountain summit, establish himself
there as firmly as possible, and from thence attack the enemy's
rear by the main road. While Rosecrans was doing this McClellan
was to move the body of the army close under the enemy's guns and
be in readiness to assault the front on its being known that
Rosecrans was ready to attack in the rear.

The whole distance the flanking column would have to make was
estimated to be five miles, but it proved to be much greater. The
mountain was not only steep, but extremely rocky and rugged.
Pegram, after inspection, had regarded a movement by his left flank
to his rear as absolutely impossible.( 3)

His right flank, however, was not s