ical forms of ecclesiastical religion--forms which
are rapidly being disowned by the leaders of religious thought. Even
monism concedes that "it is better being good than bad, better being
sane than mad." This concession, and the attempt to live according to
it, constitute a proof of the presence in some form of a non-sensuous
reality and value in the constructions of materialistic monism itself.
Hence, Eucken's conception of spiritual life cannot be got rid of after
all. It will remain so long as men live above the animal level and
strive to ascend to something higher still.

When the _neo-Kantian_ movement is examined, we find that its long and
honourable history presents us with gains which cannot be measured. But
we have already noticed that in so far as this movement has specialised
within the domain of the connections of mind and body, and has attempted
to reduce psychology to the limits of the relations between the two, it
is largely outside the _inner_ meaning and value of the life of
consciousness. [p.216] Its work has proved useful in many important
respects. It has made man realise that the connection of body and mind
is not so simple a matter as materialistic naturalism would lead us to
suppose; and it has shown, on the whole, the impossibility of reducing
consciousness to mechanical elements. Even in the various forms of
psycho-physical parallelism the factor of mind and meaning stands apart
in its origin from the factors of bodily movement. But neo-Kantianism
has developed on higher lines than those of physiological psychology. It
has dealt with the presence of an inner world of thought--a world of
values and judgments of values, of norms, imperatives, and
ideals--realities which are not presented in any scheme of natural
science. It is impossible to read such a great book as the late
Professor Otto Liebmann's _Analysis der Wirklichkeit_[77] without
discovering this truth. In this great work, as well as in his _Gedanken
und Thatsachen_, Liebmann shows how man is more than a natural product.
[p.217] "Natural science," he tells us, "is a very useful, and, indeed,
an indispensable handmaid to philosophy, but it is in no manner the
first, the deepest, the most original basis of philosophy."[78]
Liebmann's successors, especially Windelband, Rickert, Muensterberg,
Adickes, and Vaihinger, work on similar lines. And there is a great deal
in Eucken's teaching which tends in the same direction. But he goes a
step fu