only should the
punishment be immediate after conviction, but detection should follow
the offence as speedily as possible. Without entering at large into
the intricate arguments concerning identity and consciousness, we may
observe, that the consciousness of having committed the offence for
which he suffers, ought, at the time of suffering, to be strong in the
offender's mind. Though proofs of his identity may have been legally
established in a court of justice; and though, as far as it relates to
public justice, it matters not whether the offence for which he is
punished has been committed yesterday or a year ago; yet, as to the
effect which the punishment produces on the culprit's own mind, there
must be a material difference.

"I desire you to judge of me, not by what I was, but by what I am,"
said a philosopher, when he was reproached for some of his past
transgressions. If the interval between an offence and its punishment
be long, it is possible that, during this interval, a complete change
may be made in the views and habits of the offender; such a change as
shall absolutely preclude all probability of his repeating his
offence. His punishment must then be purely for the sake of example to
others. He suffers pain at the time, perhaps, when he is in the best
social dispositions possible; and thus we punish the present good man
for the faults of the former offender. We readily excuse the violence
which a man in a passion may have committed, when, upon his return to
his sober senses, he expresses contrition and surprise at his own
excesses; he assures us, and we believe him, that he is now a
perfectly different person. If we do not feel any material ill
consequences from his late anger, we are willing, and even desirous,
that the passionate man should not, in his sober state, be punished
for his madness; all that we can desire, is to have some security
against his falling into any fresh fit of anger. Could his habits of
temper be instantly changed, and could we have a moral certainty that
his frenzy would never more do us any injury, would it not be
malevolent and unjust to punish him for his old insanity? If we think
and act upon these principles with respect to men, how much more
indulgent should we be to children? Indulgence is perhaps an improper
word--but in other words, how careful should we be never to chain
children to their dead faults![65] Children, during their education,
must be in a continual state of