d
ever secured? Those historians who are zealous for the glory of Peter
the Great, have eagerly refuted, as a most atrocious calumny, the
report of his having had any part in the mysterious death of his son.
But how will they apologize for the Czar's neglect of that son's
education, from which all the misfortunes of his life arose?

But all this is past for ever; the only advantage we can gain from
recalling these circumstances, is a confirmation of this important
principle in education; that, when precept and example counteract one
another, there is no hope of success. Nor can the utmost severity
effect any useful purpose, whilst the daily experience of the pupil
contradicts his preceptor's lessons. In fact, severity is seldom
necessary in a well conducted education. The smallest possible degree
of pain, which can, in any case, produce the required effect, is
indisputably the just measure of the punishment which ought to be
inflicted in any given case. This simple axiom will lead us to a
number of truths, which immediately depend upon, or result from it. We
must attend to every circumstance which can diminish the quantity of
pain, without lessening the efficacy of punishment. Now it has been
found from experience, that there are several circumstances which
operate uniformly to this purpose. We formerly observed, that the
effect of punishment upon the minds of children, before they reason,
depends much upon its _immediately_ succeeding the fault, and also
upon its being certainly repeated whenever the same fault is
committed. After children acquire the power of reasoning, from a
variety of new motives, these laws, with respect to punishment, derive
additional force. A trifling degree of pain will answer the purpose,
if it be made inevitable; whilst the fear of an enormous proportion of
uncertain punishment, will not be found sufficient to govern the
imagination. The contemplation of a distant punishment, however
severe, does not affect the imagination with much terror, because
there is still a secret hope of escape in the mind. Hence it is found
from experience, that the most sanguinary penal laws have always been
ineffectual to restrain from crimes.[64] Even if detection be
inevitable, and consequent punishment equally inevitable, if
punishment be not inflicted as soon as the criminal is convicted, it
has been found that it has not, either as a preventative, or a public
example, the same power upon the human mind. Not