o gratify
the passion of anger, to which he is unfortunately subject. Even
supposing that threateners are exact in fulfilling their threats, and
that they are not passionate, but simply wish to avoid giving pain;
they endeavour to excite the fears of their pupils as the means of
governing them with the least possible pain. But with fear they excite
all the passions and habits which are connected with that mean
principle of action, and they extinguish that vigorous spirit, that
independent energy of soul, which is essential to all the active and
manly virtues. Young people, who find that their daily pleasures
depend not so much upon their own exertions as upon the humour and
caprice of others, become absolute courtiers; they practise all the
arts of persuasion, and all the crouching hypocrisy which can
deprecate wrath, or propitiate favour. Their notions of right and
wrong cannot be enlarged; their recollection of the rewards and
punishments of their childhood, is always connected with the ideas of
tyranny and slavery; and when they break their own chains, they are
impatient to impose similar bonds upon their inferiors.

An argument has been used to prove, that in some cases anger is part
of the _justice_ of punishment, because "mere _reproof_, without
sufficient marks of _displeasure_ and _emotion_, affects a child very
little, and is soon forgotten."[69] It cannot be doubted, that the
expression of indignation is a just consequence of certain faults, and
the general indignation with which these are spoken of before young
people, must make a strong and useful impression upon their minds.
They reflect upon the actions of others; they see the effects which
these produce upon the human mind; they put themselves in the
situation alternately of the person who expresses indignation, and of
him who suffers shame; they measure the fault and its consequences,
and they resolve to conduct themselves so as to avoid that just
indignation of which they dread to be the object. These are the
general conclusions which children draw when they are _impartial
spectators_; but where they are themselves concerned, their feelings
and their reasonings are very different. If they have done any thing
which they know to be wrong, they expect, and are sensible that they
deserve, displeasure and indignation; but if any precise penalty is
annexed to the fault, the person who is to inflict it, appears to them
in the character of a judge, who is boun